Readjust, not reset: In India-China thaw, trade triumphs over rivalry

Depsang is a high topographic landmass where China and India have different views of the LAC. In the extreme north, the Chinese claim their LAC to the south of the Samar-Lungpa, while the Indian claim is to the north of the Lungpa.

Since 2009, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has encroached on the Indian land of Chip-Chap River, Samar-Lungpa 176 square kilometers, Trig Heights, Raki Nalla, Y-Junction and Depsang Bulge 972 square kilometers, Hot Spring 38 square kilometers. km, Chang-lung 13 sq km.

From the Chip-Chap River, they moved slowly south to Trigg Heights and named Point 5459 Manshen Hill. In 2009, the PLA constructed roads to access the Depsang Ridge in the Karakoram Mountains. 2009 saw over 70 intrusions. The then army chief, General Deepak Kapur, insisted that the borders were “extremely secure”.

In 2011, they cut and constructed a 30 km road along the LAC from Raki Nala to the plains of Depsang. Further south, they built another 20 km road along Jeevan Nala to reach near Murgo Post in India.

In April 2013, 40 PLA ​​troops set up remote camps on the Indian side of the LAC and after staying for 21 days, Burtse became a flashpoint. India had to do a lot of diplomatic hustling to defuse tensions, as it lacked sufficient economic and diplomatic tools to counter China’s aggression at that time.

The new agreement restores the pre-2017 status. However, the full extent of the patrol is unclear as the Chinese have built roads since 2010. The picture is a bit hazy. The temperature of Depsang is now minus 45 degrees. It is not known what will happen after the snow melts in the spring and summer.

Who blinked first? Most analyzes have glossed over the factors leading to the climb, attributing it to China’s economic slowdown. Of course, our top defense officials believe that Indian forces’ “stubbornness” has forced China to reconsider. The government’s statement in Parliament has been careful – India has met the preconditions for a meltdown; New Delhi adopted a step-by-step approach involving diplomatic, political, and military mechanisms; The next step will be on troop expansion and de-induction, and India will consider other aspects of bilateral engagement in a “calibrated manner”. There is no cause for optimism, no clear guarantee, or even hope of de-escalation. Jaishankar advised caution and suggested that financial involvement should not come at the expense of strategic caution.

Trade usually contributes to outbreaks of conflict, but ironically India and China have found a smart way to seize the moment, balancing trade demands with security needs – with restoration but not reset. Simply put, the business won over the competition.

Although China has achieved some military success, New Delhi has shown its diplomatic prowess, follow through and maturity. Compromise is about accommodating each other’s interests. Both countries want to get out of the geopolitical and economic quagmire in which they have been trapped for four and a half years. In essence, both were losing more than they were winning as rivals.

But the most worrying measure comes from Western military observers who suggest that China has exploited the post-Galwan situation to conduct extensive real-world military operations and training in the region for four and a half years against a potential enemy involving 40,000 to 40,000 troops. 60,000 troops for the first time since 1987. This was not a standalone case but was linked to China’s military deployment. View of Taiwan and the South China Sea. It gathered a critical assessment of Indian military strengths and weaknesses, in addition to insights into the scope and depth of US-Indian military intelligence cooperation.

This underscores PM Modi’s June 2020 statement, “The Chinese have not entered our territory nor have they occupied any post”. Jaishankar also recently disclosed that “China has not occupied any of our land but has deployed its forces in the upper reaches of the hilly areas along the LAC.”

What happens now? The trust factor comes into play. To be sure, China’s withdrawal is also strategic. Boundary stress appears to be a symptom, not a cause. This problem is mainly fueled by the US, which continues to create an Indo-China regional rift.

National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s recent visit to Beijing for Special Representative (SR) talks seems to have gone well. Possible issues like resumption of Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, data sharing of transboundary rivers, and cross border trade were discussed. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the meeting as “hard-won and valuable”, while the Foreign Ministry said the SRs provided “positive directions for cross-border cooperation”. boundary question.

The Chinese are unlikely to loosen their military grip until the Americans undertake a full-fledged Tibet project in the Himalayas. Without a strategic shift in thinking, and given the Sino-Russian tensions, a border solution is unlikely to come about.

What should be done in Depsang? The plateau remains uninhabited. Given the slow patrolling, it will be difficult to capture the area militarily unless local Ladakhi personnel man the posts as they did in the 70s and 80s. The challenge for the Ladakh UT Government is to expand the visibility of governance and development activities in the regions. Depsang is rich in flora and fauna as well as natural resources. Although it will take time to develop tourism in Chang Chenmo, Kugrang Valley and Gogra-Hot Springs, India should follow China’s Mount Kunlun Global Geopark model and develop Depsang north of Aksai Chin for plant landscaping and exploitation of animal resources on our side.

The author is an expert on border matters