Mossad faces consequences after massive October 7 fiasco

Mossad faces accountability for failure

On October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its most devastating attack on Israel, Mossad’s intelligence failure marked a turning point in the Middle East conflict. What was initially seen as a monumental failure has now become a revival story, exposing cracks in Israel’s intelligence infrastructure. The Mossad has not only regained its footing but has redefined its role by adopting the Octopus Strategy—a precision-driven, calculated approach to striking down its enemies.

The failure of the Mossad

The failure of the Mossad in the recent Hamas attacks clearly echoes the intelligence surveillance during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Just as Israel was blindsided by the unexpected attacks of Egypt and Syria, so on October 7, 2023, it found itself unprepared. Despite the rising tensions, the Israeli intelligence community did not expect such a bold move from Hamas. While the last-minute warning came from a Mossad asset codenamed “Angel,” the agency dismissed this crucial intelligence following its flawed assessment that Egypt lacked the capability to threaten Israel.

This historical example reveals an important insight: the main issue within the Mossad is not the ability to gather intelligence or identify threats; Rather, it lies in evaluating and responding to the information at hand. The agency has repeatedly fallen into management rather than collection of raw data

Mossad faces accountability for failure

On October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its most devastating attack on Israel, Mossad’s intelligence failure marked a turning point in the Middle East conflict. What was initially seen as a monumental failure has now become a revival story, exposing cracks in Israel’s intelligence infrastructure. The Mossad has not only regained its footing but has redefined its role by adopting the Octopus Strategy—a precision-driven, calculated approach to striking down its enemies.

The failure of the Mossad

The failure of the Mossad in the recent Hamas attacks clearly echoes the intelligence surveillance during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Just as Israel was blindsided by the unexpected attacks of Egypt and Syria, so on October 7, 2023, it found itself unprepared. Despite the rising tensions, the Israeli intelligence community did not expect such a bold move from Hamas. While the last-minute warning came from a Mossad asset codenamed “Angel,” the agency dismissed this crucial intelligence following its flawed assessment that Egypt lacked the capability to threaten Israel.

This historical example reveals an important insight: the main issue within the Mossad is not the ability to gather intelligence or identify threats; Rather, it lies in evaluating and responding to the information at hand. The agency has repeatedly been weak, not in collecting raw data, but in managing intelligence — often colored by bias or failing to understand the implications of available intel.

Although it remains speculative, the Mossad likely received prior intelligence about the October 7 attack but failed to perceive Hamas’s capacity for a synchronized three-pronged attack. Several factors contributed to this miscalculation.

1. Overconfidence in technology: Israel’s reliance on advanced systems such as Iron Dome and strong border security may have created a false sense of security.

2. Normalization of Arab relations: Recent diplomatic developments may lead the Mossad to underestimate tensions with Palestine, falsely believing the situation is improving.

3. split focus: The Israeli government was preoccupied with domestic political challenges, diverting attention from unrest in the West Bank and Gaza.

Furthermore, the perception that Iran was focused on the nuclear negotiations may have lulled the Mossad into a false sense of security, underestimating the potential for Iranian influence in the region. If Iran had indeed supported the attack, it would have executed a clever proxy operation, possibly ensuring deniability while distracting Israeli intelligence.

Strategic affairs expert Praveen Swamy aptly notes, “The successful conduct of war demands endless intellectual creativity.” This sentiment speaks to the urgency of constant innovation and adaptability in military strategy.

The Mossad: Failure and Comeback

After failing to preempt the October 7 attack, the intelligence agency has undoubtedly engaged in a period of introspection, learning from its past mistakes — particularly the 1973 near miss. At that critical juncture, a commission recommended extensive organizational action. The changes, which led the agency to develop an analytical framework designed to challenge prevailing military intelligence assessments. The inadequacies of 1973 stemmed largely from a closed feedback loop and a lack of analytical objectivity, which made the agency ill-calculated.

Historically, the Mossad operated under the assumption that Arab states were weak and unlikely to initiate conflict. This same flawed perspective, to an extent, led to their underestimating Hamas’s potential to launch a major offensive. Such rigor in assessment and failure to diversify assessments have entwined lethal intelligence practices with national security policies. The shocking reality of the 1973 war shattered these misconceptions, revealing the critical need for a more nuanced understanding of the adversaries.

A basic tenet of intelligence assessment insists that the intelligence produced must arise from objective analysis free of bias and bias. The Mossad’s insistence on strong objectivity often compromised its analytical rigor, leading to inaccurate estimates. As former Mossad chief Zvi Zamir observed, “We scolded them,” how intelligence and policy processes converged to create a breeding ground for disaster. Mossad’s superficial assessment relied on misrepresentation of the enemy, failing to adequately examine both the intentions and capabilities of its adversaries.

The Agranat Commission pointed to these key issues, highlighting the agency’s flawed assessment, yet the problem persisted. The intelligence agency found itself in a precarious position after the 1982 Lebanon invasion, where it faced a complex landscape of intelligence challenges.

1982 failure

The 1982 conflict marked another significant blunder for the Mossad and the upper echelons of the Israeli security establishment. At the time, they believed that rapid military engagement with Lebanon, targeting the Palestinian resistance led by Yasser Arafat, would shift the balance of power in Israel’s favor. The attack on the Israeli ambassador in London was cited as a major justification for the attack. The agency was confident that their right-wing Christian allies, the Phalangists (Katib Party), who were staunchly anti-Palestinian, would provide intelligence and combat support on an as-needed basis.

In its eagerness to form an alliance, the Mossad began operational collaboration with the Phalangists, underestimating the complexity of their motivations and the extremist tendencies within their ranks. The agency’s overreliance on its own evaluations and advocacy for these allies blinded them to potential consequences. This miscalculation culminated in the horrific Sabra and Shatila massacres, where Palestinian civilians and Shia Muslims were brutally killed. The aftermath of this atrocity played a significant role in Israel’s eventual withdrawal from Lebanon and paved the way for the clandestine rise of Hezbollah.

The Kahn Commission was convened to investigate the massacre and eventually found Israel indirectly responsible for the bloodshed. However, the agency escaped any reprimand, while Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was held responsible for his “personal responsibility” for “ignoring the threat of bloodshed and retaliation” and failing to take adequate steps to prevent it. Sharon’s negligence in protecting the civilian population of Beirut, which was under Israeli control, highlighted significant weaknesses in the broader military strategy.

Reflecting on the situation, then Mossad director Nahum Admony commented, “The agency tried to the best of its ability to present and approach the subject (Lebanese intelligence) as objectively as possible.” He admitted that while the agency strives for objectivity, subjective relationships have inevitably influenced their assessment: this admission exposes a critical flaw in the Mossad’s intelligence-gathering process: the behavior of right-wing Christians and the impact of their deployment in refugee camps. .

Fixing bugs and octopus tactics

In light of its past failures, the agency appears to be gradually correcting its assessment errors by adopting a more detailed and nuanced approach to intelligence assessment, free of biases. The agency’s recent actions—such as the targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and its preparations for an escalating conflict—highlight three critical improvements in its operational methodology.

First, the agency is now considering a wider array of dynamics and conducting more in-depth pre-strike assessments than in the past. A shift away from this limited approach enables a deeper understanding of the complex geopolitical landscape in which it operates.

Second, by allowing a greater degree of subjectivity and moving away from strict objectivity, the Mossad is becoming adept at interpreting the delicate balance of power. This careful analysis is a significant departure from previous hasty actions that often lead to tactical miscalculations.

Finally, the implementation of the Octopus strategy—focusing on precision strikes against high-profile targets—shows a shift in operational philosophy. Rather than targeting the “tentacles” of threats, this approach emphasizes hitting the “head” that reflects operational and tactical fortitude.