While Indian statements on bilateral relations with China practice brevity, Chinese statements are comparatively more expansive. Taken together, however, they provide a picture of how the relationship is valued by each party. The 23rd meeting of Special Representatives (SRs) on the India-China border issue held in Beijing earlier this week may have brought high-level bilateral exchanges closer to regular service, but the meeting also highlights persistent differences.
Comparing statements from the six SR meetings (three from each country) that have come out since the first “informal summit” between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan in 2018 – 21st (Chengdu, Nov. 2018), 22nd (New Delhi, Dec. in 2019) and the latter – it is clear that the Indian side has increasingly poor expectations of the relationship.
In its statement at the recent meeting, the Indian side specifically referred to “frictions that emerged in 2020 (June)” and seemed eager to highlight decisions such as the new patrol arrangement and the conclusion of the disengagement process as well as separate developments. “Resumption of Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, Data Sharing of Transboundary Rivers and Border Trade”. The Chinese also noted the latter point but otherwise only “positively assessed the solutions reached by the two countries on border issues”.
While the latest Indian communique emphasized the need for deployment, coordination and guidance of diplomatic and military mechanisms related to “maintaining peace and tranquility along the border and promoting effective border management”, there is no longer any talk of “promotion(ing)” in particular. ) exchange and communication between border personnel”, perhaps reflecting the desire and reality of reducing direct contact between actual troops on the ground. No-patrolling buffer zones in some areas along the LAC.
As in 2021, similarly in its latest statement, the Chinese described a six-point consensus that the Indians did not accept. While previous Indian statements have described the talks as “constructive and forward-looking”, the latest talks have instead called for “a resolution to inject more vitality into the process”.
Oddly, however, the Indian SR statement spoke of “seeking a fair, practical and mutually acceptable framework for the settlement of the border question”, although such a framework exists in the form of bilateral treaties, notably, the 2005 Agreement on Political Standards. and guiding principles for the settlement of the India-China border question. China’s reference to the 2005 treaty in its most recent statement and in recent ones clearly carries little weight given how they have repeatedly violated it. In contrast, India has shown reluctance to refer directly to existing legal agreements and – like the Chinese – has preferred to refer instead to “instructions”, “instructions” or “decisions” of the meeting between Modi and Xi.
The danger now exists – as was the case after Doklam in 2017 – that the Indian government may once again take its foot off the gas pedal of sustained political, diplomatic, military and economic pressure on China to achieve short-term gains. While a further round of “informal summits” is out of the question, formal exchanges also need to be carefully calibrated in terms of their frequency, scope and deliverables.
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, in a statement to Parliament earlier this month, said “consider the urgency of diplomatic efforts to defuse these simmering tensions and restore peace and tranquility”. The Indian government is yet to answer the question why the need to de-escalate and restore peace is always an Indian “need” but not a Chinese one. Instead, Indian diplomacy in China has for some time oscillated between extremes – either pomp and ceremony imply little or rather a masochistic thrill in going through the grind of endless negotiations (Hindi for pointless grind, often as punishment) as a way of proving itself. Diplomatic pressures instead of focusing on the actual outcome and its long-term effects.
And the result – despite many on the Indian side crowing about strategic patience and resolve paying dividends as the ongoing disengagement process in eastern Ladakh – is simply that the Chinese have dashed all Indian expectations of a peaceful border settlement. -Since time is short, the problem of de-escalation should be solved first. In essence, though it is morally and politically justified, the Chinese have shown strategic patience and resolve to force the Indians to retreat from a position of strength. It is entirely possible that de-escalation will now proceed much more slowly than disengagement, if it proceeds at all.
With India’s lack of a proactive, like-for-like response to China’s 2020 violation of bilateral agreements on LAC now apparent, Beijing can perhaps breathe a little easier that a China front with India is unlikely to pose a major threat. to focus on its other fronts with active territorial disputes. For China then, its 2020 action and current disengagement process is effectively a case of two steps forward, one step back, and one step gained.
This reality could bring even more pressure from the Americans under Donald Trump – now determined and determined to follow through on threats to enemies and friends alike – for New Delhi to adopt a broader American approach towards China instead. It also risks confirming to India’s other partners involved in long-standing tensions with China that New Delhi cannot be expected to intervene usefully to ease Chinese pressure on them.
The author is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, and Director, Center of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.
Why should you buy our membership?
You want to be the smartest in the room.
You want access to our award-winning journalism.
You don’t want to be confused and misinformed.
Choose your subscription package