The world seems to have long settled on the understanding that Iran and Syria have acted almost as one nation in pursuit of strategic security and foreign policy. As the main supporter of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the Ayatollahs of Iran gained considerable strategic advantage from the region of the Levant under Syrian control. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support for Iran and Syria added to their comfort, and the presence of Russian troops in Syria despite Ukrainian battlefield demands only shows how serious Mr. Putin is about his foothold in the Middle East and his relationship with Iran. Syria Coalition. The progressive hollowness of the Bashir Assad administration and years of corruption and unprofessionalism in the Syrian army have led Russia to focus entirely on the front in Ukraine, something that never happened in Russia. Iran was also so completely obsessed with its successful race to strengthen Hezbollah that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s master of proxy war tactics, failed to notice that its grip on Syria was largely weakened through the Syrian army. Whether the weakening of Syrian civilian and military capabilities was a deliberate non-military strategy pursued by an external power is still unknown, but the advantage now accrues not to one side but to multiple powers. Among them are the United States, Turkey, Israel and radical Sunni elements who have competed for space in the Levant. No one else has a common interest except America and Israel. Iran and Russia are the biggest losers from recent events. The Jerusalem Post wrote: “Iran’s defeat is stunning. Assad’s fall toppled the crown jewel of an arc of resistance that Iran had spent more than 35 years building as a counterbalance to Israel and US influence in the region. With this corner stone removed, the pressure is effectively broken.” It is said that when a revolution occurs and takes the world by surprise, one must always be prepared for a counter-revolution. So, is there a possibility of a counter-revolution in the making? Both the factors at play and the strategic environment do not indicate this, and for several reasons this reading To be sure. Hamas’s actions in Gaza triggered a series of events that Iran misread as an opportunity. It activated its proxy strategy by increasing Israel’s involvement, but In the agreement, 15 months later, the entire leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah has been wiped out, and the entire supply chain for the movement of the military – Hezbollah – has been completely disrupted The fall of Assad and the neutralization of Syria’s military are also the result of a number of factors, the final nail being a chain reaction set in motion by Hamas on October 7, 2023 The two major wars in the Middle East, Ukraine and the Gaza-Lebanon race, ensured that the strategic advantage Russia gained by supporting Iran, Syria and Basir Assad was not a priority. However, Mr Putin, never prone to sentimentality, is trying to regain lost ground. He first described HTS as “terrorists”, but shortly thereafter the Russian Foreign Ministry referred to HTS as the armed Syrian opposition. A clear overture to the new ruling authority in Syria, he gave Assad only one reason and refuge to refuse to meet. How long this shelter will last is anyone’s guess. It is a quasi-counter-revolution in the making, if that; The reverse of the US-Israeli advantage was achieved as a result of the meltdown in Syria.
Obviously, Mr. Putin can’t do much alone, the Russians don’t have that kind of bandwidth about the Middle East. They need the services of Iran and perhaps some of its proxies. However, HTS, which is a Sunni extremist organization, could work with Iran for any strategic advantage. But HTS is not a proxy for the US or Turkey, there is always the possibility of working in close cooperation with Iran. It should be noted that Hezbollah is a Shiite organization with ideological ties to Iran, but no such ties to Hamas. It is a Sunni Islamist organization with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’s ideology is deeply rooted in Sunni Islamic principles, advocating the establishment of an Islamic state in historic Palestine. However, Hamas enjoys support from Iran due to shared strategic interests, particularly in opposition to Israel. This alliance is more practical than ideological, as their religious differences are significant. Iran has provided financial support, weapons and training to Hamas, especially during its secession from Sunni Arab states. Despite this cooperation, Hamas and Iran maintain separate religious and ideological frameworks.
Two other issues are also important in the context of the Syrian aftermath. Since 1979, the rule of the ayatollahs has been unshakable, but sporadic cases of defiance of theological rules have been frequent. The people of Iran do not fully support the Ayatollahs. Failure on the strategic front encourages the building of resistance on the street. This is what Iran will be worried about because the movements considered here need a cause and leadership. Because there can be plenty, it is also a dynamic leadership and external support that can pose a threat to the status quo.
The United States under incoming President Donald Trump may be cautious about external engagement, but Iran remains an anathema and Mr. Trump has a particular disdain for the Ayollahs. US strategic circles, along with Israel and perhaps Saudi Arabia (only to a limited extent), may see this as an opportunity. Iran’s long-term strategy, on the other hand, revolves around building a strong Shiite crescent from Syria to Yemen, drawing in majority and minority Shiite populations. It has developed rapidly in the last few years. A sudden slowdown in the rising tide could prompt Iran to intensify its efforts to acquire the crescent. That’s where the conflict could re-emerge, re-energizing sectarian divisions within Islam, and the world was once again deeply affected by that resurgence.