Rising Jihadist Threats and U.S’s Dangerous Choices

Syrian Civil War: Proxy Battles and Unchecked Terror

Syria’s descent into chaos since the 2011 Arab Spring has tragically unfolded into a brutal civil war, driven not just by internal strife but also by external powers vying for influence in the region. The complex web of foreign interventions has transformed Syria into a battleground where the United States, Iran, Russia, and various other regional actors each pursue their own strategic interests. While the U.S. supported the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime as part of its broader Middle Eastern agenda, Iran and Russia have firmly backed Assad, seeing Syria as a crucial ally in maintaining their regional foothold. However, as much as proxy wars are defined by geopolitical manoeuvring, they are equally shaped by the rise of jihadist movements that threaten to destabilise not only Syria but the broader region.

The jihadist dimension of Syria’s conflict cannot be overstated. Rooted in the wider wave of Islamist activism that swept across the Middle East—especially following the Arab Spring uprisings—Syria has become the epicenter of a violent struggle between various Islamist factions, many of them tracing their ideological roots back to the Muslim Brotherhood. Historically, Syria’s Arab nationalist Ba’athist government, under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad, sought to quash Islamist movements, including the influential military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Marwan Hadid. The bitter struggle ended with Hadid’s surrender after months of violent resistance, but it also laid the foundation for the rise of extremist elements in Syria’s political landscape.

Fast-forward to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, and we see these old rivalries reignited. The Al-Nusra Front, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, emerged as one of the key players, initially focused on overthrowing Assad’s regime and establishing an Islamic state within Syria. But Al-Nusra’s ideology soon came into conflict with that of ISIS (ISIL), which aimed to spread its jihadist ambitions beyond Syria’s borders and establish a global caliphate. While both groups shared a violent interpretation of Islam, their tactical differences and competing visions for jihad led to open hostilities. Al-Nusra’s attempt to distance itself from Al-Qaeda in 2016, rebranding itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS), was a strategic move to gain more local support. However, this shift did not remove the group from the radar of global powers like the U.S., who continued to view it as a threat due to its connections with Al-Qaeda.

Syrian Civil War: Proxy Battles and Unchecked Terror

Syria’s descent into chaos since the 2011 Arab Spring has tragically unfolded into a brutal civil war, driven not just by internal strife but also by external powers vying for influence in the region. The complex web of foreign interventions has transformed Syria into a battleground where the United States, Iran, Russia, and various other regional actors each pursue their own strategic interests. While the U.S. supported the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime as part of its broader Middle Eastern agenda, Iran and Russia have firmly backed Assad, seeing Syria as a crucial ally in maintaining their regional foothold. However, as much as proxy wars are defined by geopolitical manoeuvring, they are equally shaped by the rise of jihadist movements that threaten to destabilise not only Syria but the broader region.

The jihadist dimension of Syria’s conflict cannot be overstated. Rooted in the wider wave of Islamist activism that swept across the Middle East—especially following the Arab Spring uprisings—Syria has become the epicenter of a violent struggle between various Islamist factions, many of them tracing their ideological roots back to the Muslim Brotherhood. Historically, Syria’s Arab nationalist Ba’athist government, under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad, sought to quash Islamist movements, including the influential military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Marwan Hadid. The bitter struggle ended with Hadid’s surrender after months of violent resistance, but it also laid the foundation for the rise of extremist elements in Syria’s political landscape.

Fast-forward to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, and we see these old rivalries reignited. The Al-Nusra Front, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, emerged as one of the key players, initially focused on overthrowing Assad’s regime and establishing an Islamic state within Syria. But Al-Nusra’s ideology soon came into conflict with that of ISIS (ISIL), which aimed to spread its jihadist ambitions beyond Syria’s borders and establish a global caliphate. While both groups shared a violent interpretation of Islam, their tactical differences and competing visions for jihad led to open hostilities. Al-Nusra’s attempt to distance itself from Al-Qaeda in 2016, rebranding itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS), was a strategic move to gain more local support. However, this shift did not remove the group from the radar of global powers like the U.S., who continued to view it as a threat due to its connections with Al-Qaeda.

By 2017, JFS merged with other factions to form Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an even more hardened Sunni extremist coalition. Though HTS sought to present itself as a local Syrian force, its ties to Al-Qaeda, especially through its faction Hurras al-Din, remained a matter of concern for the West. Despite public attempts to downplay these affiliations, JFS’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, later admitted in an interview that these ties were never fully severed. This ongoing jihadist presence in Syria’s northern regions complicates not only the U.S. and its allies’ efforts to stabilise the country, but also exacerbates the already volatile situation on the ground.

Today, Syria’s jihadist landscape is a fractured one, with at least four distinct fronts. First, there are the Sunni hardliners, primarily focused on regional jihad to overthrow Assad’s government and replace it with an Islamic state. Second, there is ISIS, whose ambitions extend well beyond Syria, seeking a global jihad. The third front is represented by the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish and Arab groups fighting for a secular, democratic Syria—anathema to both the Assad regime and jihadist elements. Finally, there is the political and military opposition, embodied by the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is made up of groups committed to removing Assad’s regime but often divided by ideological and tactical differences.

This complex web of competing ideologies, sectarian rivalries, and shifting allegiances has left Syria in a perpetual state of conflict. The United States and its allies, while ostensibly supporting the opposition and fighting ISIS, have been drawn into a labyrinth of proxy wars, sometimes working with groups that may have more radical long-term goals than they initially let on. The rise of jihadist factions like ISIS and HTS has turned Syria into not only a battleground for political control but also a breeding ground for terrorism, one that threatens to spill over into neighboring countries and beyond. 

The Dangerous Resurgence 

The resurgence of Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its growing influence in Syria is a deeply concerning development for both the region and the broader international community. After years of stagnation, HTS has regained its footing, exploiting a power vacuum created by shifting allegiances and external conflicts. The group’s tactical acumen and ability to capitalise on the chaos of Syrian civil war were made evident in late 2024, when a new wave of offensives, spearheaded by HTS and its allies, started to reshape the battlefield. This marked the beginning of a fresh chapter in Syria’s endless bloodshed, with opposition forces making significant territorial gains, most notably in Aleppo, which fell into their hands after years of being controlled by Assad’s regime. As of early December, these forces advanced further, capturing Hama and pushing into central Syria—a dramatic shift in the balance of power.

This military momentum, fueled by Islamist and nationalist forces coalescing under the HTS banner, has raised the stakes in a way that has reverberations beyond Syria’s borders. The timing of this resurgence is crucial, coinciding with regional instability caused by the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. With both Russia and Iran—key backers of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—embroiled in their own global conflicts, they find themselves less able to provide decisive support to Assad. This has created a rare window of opportunity for opposition forces, including jihadist factions, to regain ground. In turn, this shift could pave the way for a new round of civil conflict, one that could spiral even further as both regional and transnational terror groups seek to capitalise on the Syrian civil war. 

While HTS’s military resurgence is alarming in itself, its potential to trigger a broader transnational jihadist movement cannot be underestimated. Despite their public claims of limiting their actions to Syria, groups like HTS have a track record of attempting to extend their influence into neighboring regions. The Islamic State (ISIS) could very well take advantage of the shifting dynamics, potentially launching its own resurgence. The U.S. has already noted the growing activity of ISIS and has intensified strikes against the group in an attempt to preemptively contain any resurgence. However, the prospect of a wider conflict remains high, especially given the four key factors at play.

First, the Syrian National Army (SNA)—a Turkish-backed coalition fighting against both Assad loyalists and Islamist factions—has made significant territorial gains in recent months. This includes capturing SDF-controlled areas and strategic locations like an airbase in Aleppo, a blow to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and a part of the broader effort to push back Assad’s forces. The SNA’s growing influence threatens to escalate the conflict further, drawing in even more factions with conflicting interests.

Second, HTS’s capture of Aleppo and its further advances into central Syria have set the stage for an inevitable military confrontation with the SNA. The resulting clashes between these two forces could ignite a series of counteroffensives, drawing in other jihadist factions like ISIS, which sees this turmoil as an opportunity to push its own agenda.

Third, the recent offensive by the SNA has severely weakened the SDF, cutting off critical communication and supply corridors between the Kurdish-controlled areas in the northeast and the opposition-held regions in the northwest. This strategic blow has left the SDF vulnerable, potentially paving the way for further fragmentation and the rise of competing factions within the opposition.

Lastly, ISIS may be poised to exploit these fractures. If the SNA and HTS continue to clash, and if the SDF finds itself on the back foot, ISIS could target these weakened factions to regain ground. With these dynamics at play, the region is primed for yet another round of bloodshed, and the possibility of a full-fledged resurgence of ISIS cannot be ruled out.

Is the U.S. Ready to Bet on Syria Again? 

The United States finds itself at a crossroads in Syria once again. The situation on the ground, which had been relatively stable in recent years, has dramatically shifted, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. strategy. In the early stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama administration took an aggressive stance, launching a covert operation known as Timber Sycamore. This CIA-led program aimed to arm and train Syrian opposition forces, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as part of a broader effort to destabilise the Assad regime. Billions of dollars in weapons and supplies were funneled into the conflict, hoping to bolster rebel forces and push back against both Assad’s government and the rising influence of jihadist groups. However, the program, while initially deemed a success, ultimately failed to produce lasting change. Many of the weapons supplied ended up on the black market, fueling further instability and, in many cases, falling into the hands of terrorist organisations like ISIS.

By 2017, President Donald Trump made the decision to end the program, citing the growing risks of arming factions that were increasingly difficult to control, and the realisation that the U.S. was not making significant strides in shifting the balance of power in Syria. Critics of the program, including intelligence analysts, raised alarms about its long-term efficacy and the unintended consequences of such a broad and uncontrolled policy. Fast forward to 2024, and the geopolitical landscape has shifted. The resurgence of HTS and the growing instability in Syria are now seen as both a regional and global security concern. With the risk of ISIS reasserting itself, and the regional influence of Iran, Russia, and Turkey all at play, the U.S. faces a stark choice: to re-enter the fray with a more direct and involved strategy, or to continue with its limited offensive approach, targeting specific threats like ISIS.

If the U.S. decides to reinitiate covert operations, it will have to face risks. A return to supporting opposition forces could, once again, mean that weapons and funding are diverted to unpredictable actors, including radical factions that could threaten not just Syria, but the wider Middle East. The temptation to back a stronger force against Assad might seem like an attractive option for those hoping to contain Iranian and Russian influence in the region, but the lessons of Timber Sycamore should serve as a cautionary tale. Arming factions without a clear strategy or a long-term plan for stabilisation may lead to a repeat of past mistakes, with arms ending up in the hands of groups that the U.S. has no intention of supporting.

On the other hand, if the U.S. opts for a more cautious, limited approach—targeting specific terror groups like ISIS through airstrikes and “self-defense” operations—the risks are also significant. While such a strategy might allow the U.S. to avoid a full-blown engagement, it could also lead to a situation where Syria’s future is no longer in American hands. As various opposition groups, including HTS and the SNA, gain more ground and the SDF weakens under pressure from the Assad regime and Turkish-backed forces, the U.S. could find itself sidelined, unable to influence events or protect its interests. Furthermore, the growing presence of jihadist groups, especially ISIS, could turn Syria into a larger breeding ground for global terrorism, presenting a significant threat to Western security.

In both scenarios, the U.S. is faced with a set of dangerous choices, each with its own set of risks and consequences. The reality is that the window for a limited intervention may have passed. The conflict in Syria has “unfrozen” into a much more complex and unpredictable situation. The days of operating in the shadows with covert programs or piecemeal military strikes may no longer be viable. If the U.S. is to re-engage, it will require a more assertive, collective strategy that involves not just military action but also diplomatic efforts and support for local forces that can stabilise the country in the long term.

Whether through renewed support for opposition groups, a broader counter-terrorism strategy, or a new approach to Assad’s regime, any U.S. intervention must serve a larger strategic objective. This is no longer a conflict that can be managed through limited, reactive measures. The stakes are too high, and the consequences of inaction or half-hearted action too severe. The U.S. must decide whether it’s willing to bet on Syria again—and if so, how it will play its hand in a game that is more unpredictable and dangerous than ever before.