Indo-China border tensions: risk of future conflict
In October 2024, after nearly four years of diplomatic negotiations, India-China reached an agreement on several border posts along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). real border between two countries.
The agreement allows the withdrawal of troops from the highly contested friction points of Depsang and Demchok. This allows soldiers from both sides to conduct coordinated patrols in these two areas to prevent further tensions and hostilities.
This has somewhat calmed, at least temporarily, the growing sentiment about the area claimed by the two countries along the LAC.
However, the India-China border dispute is not likely to resolve the border dispute and border tension. It is very likely that this tension will continue.
Recent border tensions began in May 2020 with Chinese incursions at several points along the LAC.
Multiple explanations have been offered for China’s actions covering a wide spectrum. They include domestic problems in China (the slowdown in China’s economy and the risks posed by COVID-19 and the loss of position in global affairs).
Some developments in India were also instigated by China, such as the sudden division of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories – J&K and Ladakh, which shares a border with China. Home Minister Amit Shah’s statement on restoring Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Aksai Chin as part of India, rapid infrastructure development by India along the disputed border and growing ties with the United States.
In June 2020, Indian and Chinese forces clashed in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides after nearly 45 years. That conflict soured bilateral relations, raising tensions and increasing mistrust between the two countries.
Both sides stationed millions of troops and heavy weapons and modern military platforms in the LAC. This created the possibility of war between the two nuclear-armed ‘Asian giants’. Negotiations at the diplomatic and military levels could not break the deadlock.
Now that four years later, a disconnect has occurred, scholars and analysts have offered several explanations for the breakthrough. A primary motivation, they claim – a view not shared by this author – is the need to improve economic relations. As US-China and Sino-European Union tensions escalate, China wants to tap into India’s growing economy. India needs access to Chinese imports for rapid industrialization and increased exports.
Both countries are also aware of the two-front war. India is at the same time with China and Pakistan, where China wants to avoid a similar situation with the US and its allies in Taiwan and the South China Sea on the one hand, and with India on the other.
Some scholars also argue that India wants engagement with China to reduce its dependence on the US and preserve its strategic autonomy.
India-China agreement is beneficial for both sides. However, there are several factors that increase the likelihood of future crises.
The primary risk factor for potential conflict is the lack of regular political dialogue at the highest levels and distrust of existing high levels.
There is always a risk that one party will try to seize territory in the intermediate zone in violation of the agreement. Tensions are also likely to flare up at other points along the disputed border – particularly in eastern Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, where military clashes have taken place since Galwan.
De-escalation and de-induction are yet to take place in LAC. At least 50,000-60,000 troops and technologically sophisticated military platforms from each side are still deployed in the LAC.
The extent of Sino-Indian military investments aimed at strengthening their border positions while building offensive forces sufficient to defeat the enemy is creating a security dilemma. The construction of new airfields, border posts, and infrastructure modernization on one side of the LAC is fueling a corresponding military buildup on the other side.
The offensive capabilities developed by both armies in Ladakh and other areas of the LAC highlight the belief of both Beijing and New Delhi that the outcome of their border dispute depends on which side can gain and maintain a military advantage.
There is also great mistrust between both parties. Most of the confidence-building measures between the two countries were ignored or scrapped when China invaded the LAC in May 2020.
Both countries are more interested in holding onto their territory and strengthening their position in LAC than in any meaningful political talks at the top level. Only such dialogue can build trust, reduce tensions, and lay the groundwork for new trust-building measures.
In addition, standoff missiles and drones are an increasingly integral part of mutual defense strategies. Yet there is no clear understanding between China and India about the growing implications of using these platforms in conflict. Both Beijing and New Delhi lack experience and understanding of how the other state would react to drones and missiles playing a leading role in conflict or war.
This is particularly worrisome as both nations seek to leverage local military imbalances to establish new “facts on the ground” that could lead to more frequent and intense border crises.
Neither country is actively working to address how to stop the horizontal escalation of border disputes.
India has a significant naval advantage over the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean and may conclude that planning and disrupting Chinese civilian shipping could force concessions along the LAC in times of crisis.
Without mutual recognition of the various interrelated pathways for unintended escalation, the risk of limited intrusions turning into major conflicts increases.
Therefore, India-China bilateral relations are likely to be turbulent in the near future.
New Delhi has repeatedly said that the state of the border/LAC will determine the state of India-China bilateral relations.
Although the agreement on the India-China border dispute is a welcome development, both sides need to take steps to maintain peace on the border. Modus vivendi To prevent the emergence of conflicts.
Raj Verma is Associate Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360 information™.